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ARE THERE NOTHING BUT TEXTS IN THIS CLASS?
INTERPRETING THE INTERPRETIVE TURNS IN LEGAL
THOUGHT
ROBIN L. WEST*
INTRODUCTION
Allan Hutchinson remarks at the beginning of his interesting
article that Gadamer's writings have had only a peripheral influence
on legal scholarship-only occasionally cited, and then begrudgingly
so, and never given the serious attention they deserve or require.'
Nevertheless, Hutchinson acknowledges, Gadamerian influences can
be noted-particularly in the now widely shared understanding that
adjudication is, fundamentally, an interpretive exercise.2 Even with
this qualification, though, I think Hutchinson understates Gadamer's
impact. Whatever may be true of Gadamer's influence in other
disciplines, his influence in law has been unambiguously both broad
and deep -although it has come in what, at least at first glance, seems
to be a surprising place. Gadamer has had less of an impact than one
might have thought on conservative or liberal legal thought,
particularly given the Burkean conservatism of much of his writing,
and the striking similarities between his own and liberal theories of
adjudication.3 But in the Canadian, American, and English critical
legal studies movement, Hans-Georg Gadamer's influence has been
undeniable, and recognition of the debt owed has hardly been
begrudging. Indeed, it is no exaggeration to say that Hans-Georg
Gadamer directly or indirectly set much of the agenda for the entire
founding generation of critical legal scholars. That is no insignificant
feat, given that the critical legal studies movement was the first
movement since the legal realists of a half century earlier to be
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.
1. Allan C. Hutchinson, Work-in-Progress: Gadamer, Tradition, and the Common Law, 76
CHI-KENT L. REv. 1015, 1015-16 (2000).
2. Id.
3. The exception of course is Ronald Dworkin, who explicitly relied upon Gadamer in his
major work on judicial interpretation, Law's Empire. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 55,
62 (1986).
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rigorously and consciously critical, rather than reformist, of our most
basic legal norms, institutions, and adjudicative practices. Gadamer
set the direction, tone, and much of the content of our critical
contemporary movements in legal thought.
This outstanding group of articles in this Symposium on
Gadamer's work and the current state of critical legal theory provides
an opportunity to assess the influence of Gadamer's ideas in critical
legal thought. More specifically, it provides an opportunity to assess,
amplify, and then respectfully criticize the "paradigm shift" in critical
legal thought that Gadamer's meditations on the nature of
interpretive meaning helped to trigger. In large part because of the
influence of Hans-Georg Gadamer, critical legal scholars now
commonly regard the task of understanding legal texts, and the task
of criticizing legal texts as, essentially, interpretive enterprises-rather
than (to take just a few possibilities), historical enterprises,
adjudicative enterprises, political enterprises, or, for that matter,
unambiguously critical enterprises.4  What legal scholars, legal
historians, judges, and legal critics essentially do, according to
Gadamer, is interpret-not just analyze, discover, apply, or criticize-
legal texts.5  Consequently, understanding the nature of inter-
pretation-how it is possible, what constrains it, what does not
constrain it, what ought to constrain it, what it consists of, what it
requires of us, and how it does (or does not) facilitate criticism of law,
and if so what sort of criticism, is now a central task-is perhaps the
central task-of critical legal scholarship.
This quite fundamental shift in the way we think about the work
of both understanding and criticizing legal texts is what is generally
captured in the provocative phrase "the interpretive turn,"'6 at least as
that phrase applies to legal scholarship: when used by legal scholars,
the phrase typically refers to the somewhat diffuse moment, in late
4. The literature on the interpretive turn in law is voluminous. This Symposium, coupled,
perhaps, with Interpretation Symposium, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 1 (1985), might be the best
"bookend" approach to the subject for the uninitiated.
5. See HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 310, 327, 328-30, 518-19 (Joel
Weinsheimer & Donald G. Marshall trans., Continuum Publ'g 2d rev. ed. 1993) (1960).
6. See George H. Taylor, Critical Hermeneutics: The Intertwining of Explanation and
Understanding As Exemplified in Legal Analysis, 76 CHI-KENT L. REV. 1101 (2000) (providing
an excellent and short summary of the origin and impact of the "interpretive turn" in the
humanities, social sciences, and law); see also CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF
CULTURES 3-33 (1973). This classic work is widely and correctly credited with achieving this
"turn" in anthropology and, by extension, the social sciences generally. Gadamer's Truth and
Method had the same effect for the humanities. The interpretive turn in law-in some ways a
social science itself, in another way a branch of the humanities-was predetermined, or at least
influenced, by both developments.
[Vol. 76:1125
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twentieth-century critical legal scholarship, when attention shifted to
the tasks of doing and understanding the work of interpretation. 7
And, Hutchinson's reservations notwithstanding, that interpretive
turn, which has had such a pervasive, across-the-board impact on both
the nature of the questions asked and provisional answers given in
critical legal studies, owes a huge debt to Hans-Georg Gadamer.
Gadamer himself, after all, authored the strongest, most persuasive
set of arguments supporting the claim that adjudicative work in
particular, (as well as many other sorts of work) is essentially
interpretive. 8 Further, Gadamer's opus has inspired two generations
of critical legal scholars to work through the implications of that quite
basic and important stance. If that is correct, then Gadamer's
influence (whether or not acknowledged by those who are in fact
indebted to him), at least in legal thought, can hardly be overstated.
What I want to offer in this Article commenting on the articles in
this Symposium celebrating the centennial of Gadamer's birth is an
interpretation of the interpretive turn itself-and I want to do it
toward the end of criticizing where the interpretive turn has taken us.
The critical interpretation I will offer of the interpretive turn will
emphasize two of its relatively unremarked features. First, I want to
emphasize, indeed insist upon, its multiplicity. There has been, I will
argue, not one interpretive turn in legal theory, but several, or at
least, several distinct ways in which the interpretive turn has altered
the direction of critical legal thought. More concretely, as I will argue
in the bulk of this Article, there have been at least seven such turns in
legal thought, and my first goal is simply to map them out. Second, I
want to try to clarify, in my interpretation of various interpretive
turns of legal theory and critical legal theory, not so much the nature
of hermeneutic interpretation-the subject in some way of all of these
articles -as the nature of the turn. Every turn in life is a turn away
from something as well as a turn toward something. This is as true of
turns in critical legal theory as it is true of turns on the Appalachian
Trail. My basic claim is that every interpretive turn in critical legal
thought has entailed a turn away from something, as it has directed us
7. See Stephen M. Feldman, How to Be Critical, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 893, 893 (2000)
[hereinafter Feldman, How to Be Critical]; Stephen M. Feldman, The New Metaphysics: The
Interpretive Turn in Jurisprudence, 76 IOWA L. REV. 661, 681 (1991) [hereinafter Feldman, The
New Metaphysics]; Thomas C. Grey, The Constitution As Scripture, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1, 1
(1984); Hutchinson, supra note 1, at 1015, 1015-16; Francis J. Mootz III, Rhetorical Knowledge
in Legal Practice and Theory, 6 S. CAL. INTERDiSC. L.J. 491 (1998); Taylor, supra note 6, at
1101.
8. See generally GADAMER, supra note 5.
2000]
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toward interpretation. I want to highlight what the interpretive turn
has turned us from, rather than what it has turned us toward.
Of course, some might deny that there has been any turning
from, other than, perhaps, the turn from the darkness of self-
deception to the light of self-discovery and authenticity. For some
Gadamerians, including some writing for this Symposium, the
Gadamerian truth that we are always interpreting is as inevitable and
necessary a truth about the human condition as the truth that day
follows night.9 To switch metaphors, interpretation is as constant a
human occupation as breathing; that we always do it, when acting
socially or communicatively, which is all the time, expresses a
descriptive truth about us rather than a prescriptive goal toward
which we ought strive. But if that is so, then there is something very
wrong with the phrase "interpretive turn" itself: obviously, inter-
pretation cannot be something toward which it is possible to turn and
also be ubiquitous; to turn toward interpretation clearly implies that
we are turning away from something else. Perhaps the conjoining of
the words "interpretation" and "turn" in the phrase "the interpretive
turn" is an unfortunate mistake, and not quite intended. But whether
intended or not, I think interpretation is not inevitable, and that
consequently the phrase captures an important truth: at least within
critical legal theory the interpretive turn is just that-it is a chosen
path-or that is what I will try to show. It is the way we have chosen
to go. It was not necessary, and it could have been otherwise. As
critical scholars tirelessly remind us in all contexts, save this one, we
should not mistake as essential or necessary to the human condition
that which is in fact chosen.
Let me just list here, roughly in the chronological order in which
they appeared, the Gadamerian-inspired interpretive turns evidenced
by the current terrain of critical legal thought, and then take them up
sequentially below. I think the articles in this Symposium amply
demonstrate that all of these interpretive turns have been
strengthened by, and in some cases triggered by, some aspect of
Hans-Georg Gadamer's work. The interpretive turns in legal theory
include, so far, (1) a turn, in critical constitutional scholarship
9. See Fred R. Dallmayr, Borders or Horizons? Gadamer and Habermas Revisited, 76
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 825, 826-35 (2000); Feldman, How to Be Critical. supra note 7, at 904
("[The] hermeneutic quality of the physical action of throwing [a baseball] follows from
Gadamer's claim that our very being-in-the-world is interpretive."); John T. Valauri,
Interpretation, Critique, and Adjudication: The Search for Constitutional Hermeneutics, 76 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 1083, 1087-90 (2000) (providing an illuminating discussion of this dilemma, even
while ultimately aligning himself with the "ubiquitousness" of hermeneutical interpretation).
[Vol. 76:1125
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(although not, noticeably, in either constitutional adjudication or
constitutional law), toward hermeneutical, reader-centered forms of
constitutional interpretation, and away from constitutional intention-
alism, or as it is sometimes called, "originalism"; 10 (2) a turn, in
constitutional scholarship, toward hermeneutical, reader-centered
interpretation and away from noninterpretivism;" (3) a turn, still in
constitutional scholarship, toward an understanding of the Consti-
tution as necessarily interpreted, and hence necessarily textual, and
away from a nontextual understanding of what it means to have and
to understand a national constitution; (4) a turn toward interpretive
rather than consequentialist ways of criticizing laws and legal
decisions;12 (5) a turn toward an understanding of legal criticism as
being essentially a type of interpretation, and as such, both targeted
toward texts-legal criticism is criticism of legal texts-and informed
by, constituted by, and facilitated by the texts, traditions, and
prejudices of the group of which the critic is a member, and
consequently, I will argue, a turn away from social criticism; 3 (6)
more broadly, a turn toward an understanding of our moral sensibility
as being a part of our interpretive capacity, and hence itself
constituted largely by texts, and away from understandings of our
moral sensibility as distinct and differentiated from our interpretive
abilities, with a different genesis and history, and hence not so
constituted by or dependent upon texts;14 and finally (7) a turn toward
an understanding of the human animal, and the human telos, as being
essentially interpretive, communicative, and discursive, and a turn
away from other understandings of the human essence.15
Every one of these turns toward interpretation in critical legal
theory has unquestionably shifted our horizons and facilitated fresh
insights, as these articles in part show, and those insights will no doubt
be a large part of the legacy of Gadamer. Every turn toward
interpretation has also meant, however, that we have turned our
backs on other modes of acting, criticizing, communicating, or being.
10. This turn is explored in Taylor, supra note 6, at 1105-09; Valauri, supra note 9, at 1093-
95.
11. See Grey, supra note 7, at 2; Valauri, supra note 9, at 1095-99.
12. This is explored, although not in these terms, in Taylor's critique of Posner's critique of
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996). See Taylor, supra note 6, at 1111-15.
13. This is the subject of a number of the articles in this Symposium, concerned generally
with whether or not Gadamerian hermeneutics can support radical criticism. See, e.g., Feldman,
How to Be Critical, supra note 7; Hutchinson, supra note 1.
14. For an elucidation of this turn, and the debate between Habermas and Gadamer that it
triggered, see generally Dallmayr, supra note 9, at 843-51.
15. See id. at 827-35.
2000] 1129
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As we follow the path laid out by the interpretive turns, we should
from time to time glance over our shoulder and appreciate those
horizons we have left behind. We might want to go back and reclaim
them.
I. THE TURN AWAY FROM CONSTITUTIONAL INTENTIONALISM
It is clear that very few, if any, liberal, leftist, or critical scholars
believe that the intentions of either the framers of the Constitution or
the framers of the reconstruction amendments should be determi-
native of constitutional outcomes in contemporary constitutional
adjudication. It is also clear that this would most likely be the case
whether or not Gadamer had ever entered the picture. 16 After all, a
host of non-Gadamerian considerations weigh against intentionalism
in constitutional law. For example, intentionalism apparently
forecloses the Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education,7 as
the Warren Court itself recognized. 8 Brown looks morally necessary
to a contemporary just order in a liberal society; there is no obvious
normative argument for constraining contemporary legislation with
the intentions of lawmakers two centuries past. Contrary to myth, the
framers were not saints, but were, arguably, a notably self-interested,
class-conscious and amoral bunch, as anxious to secure the
institutions of slavery and property against democratic redistribution
as they were to secure the rights of individuals against overly zealous
states. 9 There is no moral reason to slavishly abide by the framers'
distorted normative judgments. After all, the United States has a
government of laws-not men. Accordingly legal texts-not the
psychological states of dead people-should be King. The framers
themselves intended otherwise. Therefore, intentionalism in the
constitutional context paradoxically entails anti-intentionalism. In
any event, the framers intentions are opaque, lost to the past,
conflicting, and multiple. Legal critics, post-Brown, for these reasons
and others, are virtually, by definition, nonoriginalists, for decidedly
homegrown and nonhermeneutical reasons.
16. A decisive moment in this turn was likely Paul Brest's non-Gadamerian attack on
originalism, in The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204
(1980); see also Paul Brest, Who Decides?, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 661 (1985).
17. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
18. Id. at 489.
19. The harshest attack on the moral authority of the framers remains CHARLES BEARD,
AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (Free Press
1986) (1913).
[Vol. 76:1125
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Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to assume from this healthy
surplus of arguments against constitutional intentionalism (or
originalism) that Gadamer's powerful hermeneutic description of
interpretive enterprises was merely redundant. Most important,
intentionalists in this homegrown American debate have conven-
tionally called themselves (and, until recently, been called by their
critics) "interpretivists."20 If Gadamer has accurately captured the
nature of interpretation, then our own homegrown conservative
interpretivists ought to forego intentionalism. This argument cleanly
implied against constitutional intentionalism by Gadamer's philo-
sophical reflections on interpretation is extraordinarily powerful. If
Gadamer is right, then we should not, and possibly cannot, ever, in
some militaristic hierarchic fashion, simply hear, understand, and
then follow orders. If we never do that, then judges and commen-
tators most assuredly do not do it in constitutional law. Furthermore,
whether or not it is possible, a nonhermeneutical "command and
obey" style of communicative order-particularly in the constitu-
tional context-is deeply antithetical to the very idea of a democratic
order, and Gadamer's hermeneutical account of the nature of
interpretation clearly showed why. To truly understand a text is to
interpret it, and to interpret it, just is to do so by using, not setting
aside, the prejudices and traditions that constitute both the reader (or
hearer) and the reader's (or hearer's) community-it is precisely
those prejudices and traditions that facilitate the reader's conversa-
tional capacity. So to understand the Due Process Clause or the First
Amendment in anything but a hermeneutical, participatory fashion is
as impossible for us human creatures as it would be to fly close to the
sun and not get burnt. Given our nature, so to speak, interpreting the
communications of others just is collaborative work; a fusing of the
reader's, the text's, and the writer's horizons. If this reasoning is
correct, it suggests a powerful argument against even the desirability,
and maybe even the possibility, of intentionalism in constitutional law
and scholarship, and powerful arguments cannot be lightly put aside.
Furthermore, and perhaps of equally great interest to
contemporary constitutionalists, if Gadamer is right, then those
claiming to be intentionalists or those judges claiming to decide cases
by reference to authorial intent alone are engaged either in acts of
bad faith or a peculiar sort of unintentional blindness to the bald fact
20. See Grey, supra note 7, at 1; see also Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten
Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703 (1975) [hereinafter Grey, Unwritten Constitution].
2000]
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of their own role in a shared enterprise. Intentionalist judges are
wittingly or unwittingly obfuscating by denying their own partici-
pation in the creation of meaning from a text. Importantly, the
Gadamerian claim is not the neo-Nietzschian (or Holmesian) claim
that these judges are denying their own power, or freedom. The
Gadamerian interpreter is not particularly free, and not necessarily all
that powerful, and as other authors in this Symposium rightly argue, it
is a mistaken reading of Gadamer to insist to the contrary.21 But he or
she is a participant in the creation of meaning, and is participating by
bringing to the quest for meaning a panoply of facilitating traditions,
prejudices, and predispositions-all of which make the act of gleaning
meaning both possible and human. To deny this is not so much to
deny one's freedom, power, or responsibility, as to deny the ever
present influence of one's own era, community, and history, as that
era, community and history make itself felt through one's enabling
prejudices. This positive, affirmative aspect of Gadamerian herme-
neutics-Gadamer's description of the "horizon fusing" nature of
hermeneutical understanding-not only captures, quite perfectly, a
suspicion that nonintentionalists have harbored against intentionalists
throughout the twentieth century, but perhaps more importantly
captures precisely the relation of text, past ties, and present
dispositions necessary to sustain the image of an evolving, or living,
Constitution. To practice in the area of constitutional law, an
attorney must be reading a text that speaks to him or her from the
past, but the practice of law also requires that those texts be
interpreted, and interpretation, if Gadamer's description is right,
requires a set of historically situated understandings and prejudices
that simply must be brought to bear on the project of reading-the
words just would not come to life otherwise. As John Valauri shows
in the long but valuable prelude to his contribution to this
Symposium, Gadamerian hermeneutics seems to be a perfect fit with
a credible constitutional orientation that is situated between
originalism on the one hand and noninterpretivism on the other.2
When acting sensibly, judges will read the constitutional text in a way
that Gadamer suggests is true of all meaningful interpretation. 23 If
Gadamer is right, no further argument should be required, at least
with those calling themselves "interpretivists"; originalism is a human
21. See, e.g., Hutchinson, supra note 1, at 1057.
22. See Valauri, supra note 9, at 1083-87.
23. See GADAMER, supra note 5, at 309-11.
[Vol. 76:1125
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impossibility, although to deny this is a seemingly ever present human
temptation.
How precisely should we assess this quite decisive turn against
constitutional intentionalism, particularly from a progressive view-
point? Obviously, if Gadamer is correct, then the Warren Court was
exactly right in Brown to eschew too heavy a reliance on the historical
intentions of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, and to
explicitly assert instead the necessity of reading the Constitution
through the lens of present needs and predispositions. 24 They were
right to apply to the Fourteenth Amendment's nineteenth-century
text to their current understanding of the crisis in race relations. This
first interpretive turn away from intentionalism, in other words,
minimally, provides a needed account of constitu-tionalism that,
narrowly, justifies Brown, (and belatedly responds to Herbert
Wechsler's invitation to do just that)25 and that, more broadly,
underscores the desirability and necessity of constitutional
interpretation not hidebound to the mental states of the founders. In
addition, if Gadamer's account is more right than not, this first
interpretive turn is clearly to be cheered because it leads us away
from intentionalism, and hence out of the darkness of self-deception
and bad faith, and into the clarity of improved self-understanding.
What Gadamer teaches us is something important about ourselves,
not a "better way" to do the work of reading and applying texts.
Let me register two reservations about this first, foundational
(and least controversial) of the interpretive turns. First, in the spirit
of pragmatism, and for purely political and non-Gadamerian reasons,
critical theorists should perhaps be somewhat more wary than they
have been, over the last half century, of the claim that intentionalism
in constitutional law is a sort of bogeyman that is somehow akin to
original sin. Recourse to the framers' intentions, as a way to decide
cases, and from a moral or political perspective, depending upon what
it is compared to, is obviously going to look better or worse. The
assumption that it is always a bad thing to be tied to the moral
sensibilities of the framers rather than current sensibilities of judges
or their interpretive communities rests on a set of assumptions
regarding moral progress through time that may be dangerously
naive. There may be quite sound reasons, from a critical perspective,
24. See Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 492-93 (1954).
25. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L.
REv. 1 (1959).
2000]
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to develop a "romantic," intent-based, historic account of the
Constitution-or various romantic, intent-based accounts. Indeed, it
is striking that a number of more or less progressive constitutional
scholars are doing just that-developing conventional intentionalist
arguments, Gadamerian and non-Gadamerian objections to inten-
tionalism notwithstanding, concerning, to take just one salient
example, an account of the original meaning of the Constitution that
argue that the framers sought to enable rather than cripple federal
power.26 It is not obvious why critical scholars should be abdicating or
trivializing this historical work. Our history matters in constitutional
law. Constitutional law is about how we have constituted ourselves-
and if there were a history of constitutional intents (whether of the
framers or not) that lend support to progressivism, it would behoove
progressives to unearth it, not eschew its relevance.
The second reservation regarding the Gadamerian argument
against constitutional intentionalism is more in the spirit of Ockham's
razor: we should not embrace too readily the Gadamerian claim that
hermeneutical interpretation, and its anti-intentionalist implications,
rest on immutable truths of our nature, 27 if our reasons for doing so
stem primarily from a desire to defend Brown v. Board of Education,
Roe v. Wade,25 or the integrity of the Warren Court, against originalist
challenges, for the straightforward reason that we do not need to.
Even if Gadamer is flatly (or partly) wrong about the nature (or
ubiquity) of interpretation, there might be other, narrower, and
perfectly sound, if less philosophically pervasive, reasons not to
slavishly adhere to the original intent of the framers (and therefore,
assuming non-Gadamerian intentionalist premises, the meaning of
the Constitution) when deciding contemporary constitutional cases.
If this is correct, then Gadamer's argument is just excessive fat for
Ockham's razor. Constitutional law, after all, might quite sensibly be
understood to encompass more than the meanings generated by the
Constitution itself. Gadamer might be wrong, in other words, about
the necessity of hermeneutical interpretation-even if not its
possibility-and Brown and Roe might still be right, and the Warren
Court right to turn away from a historical method. We may be
saddling ourselves with a theory of interpretation (and criticism) that
26. See GARRY WILLS, A NECESSARY EVIL: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN DISTRUST OF
GOVERNMENT (1999) (a history of the idea that the Constitution was meant to instill suspicion
in the people regarding their government).
27. See GADAMER, supra note 5, at xxx, xxxii, xxxvii-xxxviii.
28. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
[Vol. 76:1125
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is surely broad and deep, but also simply not necessary to the
constitutional end to which it has been put-the validation of Brown,
and Brown-styled constitutional interpretation. If so, then we have
accepted a broad and difficult philosophical argument to answer a
considerably narrower and more ordinary political and
jurisprudential question.
In addition, it may be a broad and difficult argument that carries
significant costs of its own, particularly for critical theory. There are
at least two. The first cost is that noted or discussed by several of the
contributors to this Symposium, 9 and is one that I will discuss in more
detail below. The argument is that Gadamerian hermeneutics looks
like a plausible account of interpretation, but the very strength of its
account of how we interpret seems to undercut the possibility of
radical criticism. Gadamer's central and important point regarding
the nature of interpretation is that we interpret texts through bringing
the dispositions, prejudices, precommitments, and belief structures of
the community and time of which we are a part, to bear on the text
being construed.30 If that is so, then a pure intentionalism does seem
to be an impossibility-the reader cannot help but participate in the
process of creating meaning. However, there is a less happy
implication of this argument for intentionalism, at least for legal
critics. If interpretation of a text is only made possible through the
lenses of the readers', and hence the readers' communities,
prejudices, traditions, beliefs, and so forth, and if criticism is
invariably interpretive, then it is indeed hard to see how we are going
to get the project of criticizing our own prejudices, traditions, and
precommitments off the ground. To criticize we must interpret, and
to interpret we must invoke-not detach ourselves from-our
prejudices and traditions. It is not clear how we are able to extract
ourselves from the circle, and make those traditions the objects of our
critical gaze. Gadamer's distinctive argument against intention-
alism-that a reader's prejudices and traditions must invariably come
into play when gleaning meaning from a text 3 -does indeed seem to
undercut the possibility of radical criticism, as a number of the
participants in this Symposium duly note.
29. See, e.g., Feldman, How to Be Critical, supra note 7, at 897-99; Hutchinson, supra note
1, at 1018; Taylor, supra note 6, at 1101-05.
30. See GADAMER, supra note 5, at 302-04, 325-28, 340-41, 358, 361, 389-92, 395, 441.
31. Id. See the general discussion of Gadamer's argument against intentionalism in
Valauri, supra note 9, at 1091.
20001
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The second argument, less remarked upon by the contributors to
this Symposium, is that as a purely descriptive and even psychological
matter, Gadamer might be wrong to insist upon the necessity of
prejudice and precommitment to the connections forged, by language
and through texts, between persons. It may be that sometimes even
quite profound communications between persons occur in spite of,
rather than because of, our acquired prejudices, traditions, and
formulaic precommitments. I do not know that this romantic
understanding of the relation of author and reader or speaker and
hearer is as wildly implausible as contemporary Gadamerians have
come to believe it to be.32 Sometimes people experience reading or
listening in that way-with a romantic shock of recognition, so to
speak, of the author or speaker-and it is not obvious why that
experience should be discounted.
Nor is it the case, as Gadamerians perhaps too readily assume,
that all human connections of any sort are facilitated by textual
preconceptions, prejudices, and traditions. For example, basic human
connections between infants and parental caregivers are established
well before language facilitates the exchange of ideas, and hence the
acquisition of those acquired prejudices, traditions, and formulaic
precommitments. Bonds of affective and active connection, rather
than traditions culled from texts and encoded in human transmitters,
facilitate the love, empathy, dependency, trust, security, and care, as
well as the fear of abandonment and experience of need, that
characterize the preverbal human interaction between mothers and
fathers and their infants. Those decidedly prelingual affective
connections, furthermore, provide the basis for the trust that, no less
than social tradition, is apparently necessary for even the acquisition
of, much less the effective use of, language. It may be those
prelingual affective connections, and the trust they engender, rather
than fused horizons of blended traditions and prejudices, that
constitutes the deeper, primordial basis for the occasional or frequent
moments of mutual recognition that characterize some forms of
genuine communication between adults.
I think this possibility-the possibility that mutual recognition of
others, through texts, conversation, and otherwise, is facilitated, in
part, by our prelingual experiences, and our biologically necessitated
sociability-matters, and should not lightly be assumed away, and for
at least two reasons. First, it might actually bear on the
32. See id. at 1071-72.
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intentionalism debate. Some people, Gadamerian hermeneutics
notwithstanding, do think we glimpse an authorial intent-quite pure
and unadulterated by our own prejudices-behind an understanding
of a textual composition. It may be that that glimpse is a dim echo or
reflection of those moments of affective prelingual connection, as well
as is facilitated by them. When we understand (or think we
understand) the author's intent in a text, what we may be doing is
glimpsing its author- its author's presence-free of our linguistic
"constructedness" and then submitting to that intent. The claim that
we cannot possibly do such a thing, because all human connection and
communication is facilitated, software style, by text-digital or
verbal-seems overstated. Not all such connection and commu-
nication is so facilitated.
But more importantly, it seems to me that the possibility of
empathic, ethical connection between persons (or between persons
and animals) stemming from a pre-prejudicial and nontextual regard
for the human other is one we should not dismiss lightly, for both
political and ethical reasons. We need to recognize the humanity and
the pains and pleasures of human beings both here and around the
globe with whom we may have no textual shared points of reference,
and we need to act on that recognition if we are going to be morally
responsible world-citizens. A sensibility of our moral obligations, as
well as our critical capacities, grounded in a basic recognition of a
shared universal humanity and a shared need (or a shared capacity
for sentient pain and pleasure) for sustenance, rather than in a mosaic
of overlapping texts, traditions, or prejudices, may be a stronger basis
for the sense of global responsibility and entwined fate apparently
necessary to sustain a decently moral response to our crisis-riddled,
badly impoverished, and now disease-plagued world. The relentless
focus on the necessity of linguistic conventions, community traditions,
communal prejudice, and shared and overlapping texts-conventions,
traditions, and texts that facilitate conversation but do so by
demarcating and delineating boundaries between peoples-might
undermine rather than undergird the ethical and humanistic
universalist impulses necessary to do so-impulses which may have
their roots in our mammalian and animalistic, rather than linguistic,
selves. 33
33. Anyone who finds this point of even passing interest, should read Fred Dallmayr's
article, supra note 9, which is a sustained meditation on some of the concerns I have raised here
in the text, and a reading of the classic Habermas-Gadamer debate from this perspective.
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II. AGAINST CONSTITUTIONAL NONINTERPRETIVISM -THE
INEVITABILITY OF THE TEXT
More directly attributable to Gadamer's influence than was the
turn away from intentionalism-which, as noted above, would have
occurred with or without his intervention-is surely the turn of
intentionalism's critics away from "noninterpretivism. '' 34 This turn,
unlike the former, might well not have occurred at all but for
Gadamer's hermeneutical interventions.35 Before Gadamer's work
was absorbed into critical legal thought, it was quite conventional to
describe the major divide in constitutional theory as being between
intentionalists, strict constructionists, and originalists or "inter-
pretivists" on one side36 and, on the other side, a group of scholars
and a few judges who advocated a role for constitutional courts in the
articulation and enforcement of "fundamental values" not necessarily
articulated in the text-a group conventionally called "noninter-
pretivists. 3 7 For this group, the label "noninterpretivists" captured
something fundamental to their view of constitutional doctrine-to
wit, that the Constitution's open-ended clauses, and particularly the
Fourteenth Amendment's open-ended clauses, had to be applied in a
way that is informed by truly fundamental values, and not just those
values that happen to be articulated in the text. It also, though,
captured something central to their understanding of constitution-
alism broadly understood, and that was their conviction that
constitutional law is about the relations between power holders in the
state, citizens, and the values expressed in governance, and not
fundamentally about a document-or its meaning-at all. It is about,
the noninterpretivists thought, the way we constitute ourselves, not
just about our constitution.38 As such, practicing in the area of
constitutional law is not, at a quite basic level, about interpreting a
document at all. It requires attorneys who practice in that area to
34. See generally Grey, supra note 7.
35. See generally Interpretation Symposium, supra note 4.
36. They were called interpretivists because of their shared insistence that constitutional
law must be about interpreting (and then applying) the constitutional text. See Grey, supra note
7, at 1-2. For examples of "interpretivists," see Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some
First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971); Hans A. Linde, Judges, Critics, and the Realist
Tradition, 82 YALE L.J. 227 (1972).
37. They were called noninterpretivists because of their shared insistence that constitu-
tional law is not only what can be drawn from the text, but is also about enforcing values drawn
from somewhere other than the document. See Brest, supra note 16; Grey, Unwritten
Constitution, supra note 20; Ira C. Lupu, Constitutional Theory and the Search for a Workable
Premise, 8 U. DAYTON L. REv. 579, 583 (1983).
3& See Paul Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy, 90 YALE L.J. 1063 (1981).
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appreciate, discern, articulate, and possibly enforce society's most
fundamental political values. As such, it calls upon practitioners in
the area of constitutional law to use more than their interpretive
prowess. It requires moral wisdom, not interpretive facility. It is a
fundamentally moral, rather than a fundamentally interpretive,
enterprise-hence the label "noninterpretivists."
Gadamer changed all that. In one of the less remarked on but
surely most remarkable evolutions in the history of scholarly
conventions, noninterpretivists became interpretivists - an evolution
very much owing to Hans-Georg Gadamer's hermeneutical insights.3 9
When Tom Grey-who had ten years earlier written one of the most
cited and elegant pieces in legal literature, entitled Do We Have an
Unwritten Constitution?4°-declared in an early eighties piece on
hermeneutics that "we are all interpretivists,"' 1 what he meant, was
decidedly not that intentionalists had seen the errors of their ways
and were now happy to embrace a less rigid, reader-friendly, and
more hermeneutic approach to constitutional questions. Rather,
what he meant was that intentionalism's critics-those who had called
themselves noninterpretivists and had done so in order to signal their
departure from the text-were now happy to join intentionalists
under the textual, constitutional, "interpretivist" umbrella.42 With a
sufficiently elastic understanding of interpretation-an understanding
that accepts, indeed insists on, an active role of the reader in the
creation of constitutional meaning-and a sufficiently elastic
understanding of the constitutional text-an understanding that
includes all sorts of constitutional practices, top to bottom, as well as
constitutional phrases-noninterpretivists could drop the "non" and
could reclaim their ties to the "constitution." The phrase, "we are all
interpretivists" 4 now meant, essentially, that those advocating the
articulation and enforcement of fundamental values through the
vehicle of constitutional adjudication could and should recast their
argument within the familiar contours of constitutional interpre-
tation.44  Interpretation, after all-properly understood in a
Gadamerian, hermeneutical fashion, rather than the discarded and
discredited intentionalism of Brown and Roe's critics-virtually
39. See Grey, supra note 7, at 1-3.
40. See Grey, Unwritten Constitution, supra note 20.
41. Grey, supra note 7, at 1.
42. See id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 3.
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required what the noninterpretivists had been doing all along: reading
and applying texts, and doing so even by bringing to the text the
"fundamental" values, prejudices, and precommitments of present
readers, and not just their historical acumen.45
What have we gained, and what has been lost, by this
interpretive turn away from noninterpretivism, and to an ecumenical,
catholic, open understanding of the elasticity of interpretive enter-
prises? First, take the gains. There was indeed, as at least some of
the architects of the turn surely hoped and assumed there would be, a
reclaiming of some measure of legitimacy and indeed relevance for
the advocates of "fundamental values" adjudication that had been
lost in their meanderings in the unmoored noninterpretivist terri-
tories.46 The high-water mark of this reclamation may well have been
the Bork nomination proceedings, during which the once-styled
noninterpretivists and now refashioned interpretivists turned the
political tables quite decisively and characterized Judge Bork-
pejoratively but no doubt correctly-as a radical intentionalist, who,
precisely because of that orientation, was beyond the pale of
acceptable constitutional practice.47 It is not clear, though, that even
from a narrowly political perspective this tables-turning has stuck, so
to speak: Supreme Court nominees in the post-Bork era now speak
routinely of strictly construing the Constitution according to its
letter.48 They absolutely never speak of either the necessity or the
desirability of fundamental values adjudication, do not even pay lip
service to hermeneutical understandings of constitutionalism, and
routinely express a view of what it means to practice constitutional
law that is in broad outline indistinguishable from Bork's own-and,
so long as they refrain from declaring their intentions one way or the
45. See Brest, supra note 38; Owen Fiss, Objectivity and Interpolation, 34 STAN. L. REV.
739 (1982).
46. Valauri neatly describes this phenomenon. See Valauri, supra note 9, at 1097-98.
47. Hearings Before Senate Comm. on the Judiciary 100th Cong., 1st Sess. Nomination of
Robert H. Bork to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, 100-1011, 2514,
2518 (1987) [hereinafter Bork Hearings] (statement of Thomas C. Grey, Professor, Stanford
Law School).
48. Hearings Before Senate Comm. on the Judiciary 101st Cong., 1st Sess. Nomination of
David H. Souter to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, 110 (1990)
[hereinafter Souter Hearings] (statement of David H. Souter); Hearings Before Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary 102d Cong., 1st Sess. Nomination of Clarence Thomas to Be Associate Justice of
the Supreme Court of the United States, 170-71 (1991) [hereinafter Thomas Hearings] (statement
of Clarence Thomas); Hearings Before Senate Comm. on the Judiciary 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
Nomination of Steven G. Breyer to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United
States, 170 (1994) [hereinafter Breyer Hearings] (statement of Steven G. Breyer).
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other with regard to Roe, they get confirmed. 49 A potential nominee
who professed a Gadamerian understanding of the work of constitu-
tional interpretation, needless to say, would have considerably more
difficulty, and one who openly advocated the enforcement of funda-
mental values not discoverable in the text of the Constitution would
be dead-in-the-water.
Whatever might have been the political fallout, however, it
seems to me there was a loss of a needed perspective that followed
the happy return of the prodigal, noninterpretive sons to the paternal
fold of constitutional interpretivism. Noninterpretivism as originally
conceived really was different: it turned our attention away from all
texts-with a considerable risk of sacrificing the virtues of legalism in
the process-and toward social reality, as a source of constitutional
understanding. Let me try to explain what I think we have lost
through an example. Think for a moment of Roe, surely the most
controversial and despised of the fundamental values cases-but also
the crown jewel, at least to some of us, of noninterpretivist
adjudication. In Roe50 the Court basically found an unwritten right to
an abortion in the first two trimesters of a pregnancy-at first blush,
as noninterpretivist a decision as could possibly be imagined.
Or was it? Let me contrast, in an admittedly simplistic way, first
a Gadamerian account, which brings even Roe into the interpretivist
fold, and then a non-Gadamerian and noninterpretivist under-
standing, or explanation, for how Roe came to be, again toward the
end of highlighting not what we have gained, but possibly what we
have lost by foregoing noninterpretivist understandings of constitu-
tionalism. First the Gadamerian reconstruction: it may be that,
contrary to the characterization of Roe I gave above as the
paradigmatically noninterpretivist case, the result in Roe came about
much like any other outcome: an "interpretive community" of
constitutional scholars, judges, lawyers, and litigants, read, inter-
preted, and understood the texts of various state laws criminalizing
abortion, and then read, interpreted, and, understood the text of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and then read, interpreted, and understood
the text of Griswold v. Connecticut," Poe v. Ullman,52 and Eisenstadt
49. Souter Hearings, supra note 48, at 54 (statement of David H. Souter); Thomas
Hearings, supra note 48, at 127 (statement of Clarence Thomas); Breyer Hearings, supra note
48, at 138 (statement of Steven G. Breyer).
50. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
51. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
52. 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
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v. Baird,53 all earlier cases interpreting that amendment. This "com-
munity of interpreters" then reached the hermeneutical, community
and reader-informed judgment that the latter texts contained
evidence of constitutional traditions and commitments, even if
penumbral, that were starkly violated by the former texts, so the
former texts had to go. On this telling, Roe is largely and properly
justified by a Gadamerian but nevertheless quite conventional
understanding of what constitutional law is all about. One text-the
state law text-is trumped by another text, hermeneutically under-
stood-the Constitution -and the latter prevails over the former. In
other words, the state law criminalizing abortion is trumped by the
United States Constitution. It is all about texts. It is all about law. It
is all about interpreting texts, hence law. It is all about finding the
relevant, controlling law; Roe is not odd, it is no different from any
other decision. If so, then the sizeable gap between the "fundamental
values" approach and intentionalism shrinks to nothing. If Roe is an
interpretive case, rather than a noninterpretive case, then "funda-
mental values" adjudication is not all that different from what had
gone before or after, and if so, then Roe is not even arguably
"illegitimate" or "illegal," as Bork and other critics of Roe have long
claimed. 4
The interpretive, Gadamerian understanding of Roe and how it
came to be does, then, restore Roe's legitimacy. But for better or
worse, there is another way of thinking about how Roe came to be.
Maybe Roe came down the way it did because a group of citizens,
activists, social critics, feminists, abortion providers, lawmakers,
scholars, and judges appraised a social reality: Too many women and
girls dead or maimed from illegal abortions. Thousands of women
and girls trapped by unwanted and nonconsensual pregnancies. Many
more smothered by the weight of the near impossibility of mothering
unwanted children in impoverished circumstances. Rampant
criminality on the part of major sectors of the medical community; a
thriving but terribly dangerous underground of abortion providers.
This group, then, intuited, in a variety of ways, and some of them
eventually argued, that this social reality just cannot be a part of the
way we constitute ourselves; it violates too many of our fundamental
values. That moral intuition, then, grasped from an appraisal of
53. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
54. See generally ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA (1990); John Hart Ely, The
Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973).
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community life and value, formed the basis of a radically transformed
constitution. On this accounting of Roe, it came to be, because some
people in positions of power and responsibility looked to the world,
and asked what it "said" about the way we constitute ourselves-not
because, as Ronald Dworkin now routinely describes the Gadamerian
heart of constitutional dialogue. They looked to the Constitution to
see what it "said" about a state's law. 5
What this social world of illegal abortion, unwanted pregnancies,
and criminal providers "said" about our Constitution-and even-
tually, through constitutional adjudication, about our constitutional
text-was that we had to incorporate a woman's reproductive choice
into our social constitution. The "fusing," then, was of a horizon
composed of judgments based on moral sense and a perception of a
worldly injustice with a horizon composed of legal possibilities, all
culminating in a constitutional crisis. It was not, fundamentally, a
fusing of conflicting interpretations of texts, themselves constituted
by tradition and prejudice. All of the texts-the text of the
substantive Due Process Clause, the texts of arguments about the
meaning of Griswold, the texts contesting the coherence of the
demarcation of trimesters, the texts regarding the use or abuse of
other texts on which Roe relied, and libraries full of texts with
supporting arguments-came later. The constitutional judgment was
forged by the fusing of an apprehension of a moral and social evil,
with a constitutional obligation to do justice.
I suspect that this latter description, simplified no doubt, is a
little closer to what actually happened in Roe, and that it is a morally
justifiable route to take toward a constitutional verdict. I also suspect
that it is close to what was originally meant by some of the advocates
of "fundamental values" adjudication, and that it was what noninter-
pretivists in some way were defending, when they defended "non-
interpretive" approaches to constitutionalism. If so, it seems clear
that the happy embrace of hermeneutical, or Gadamerian interpre-
tivism, the turn taken by our one-time noninterpretivist constitutional
scholars and theorists and activists against their own earlier self-
description, has sacrificed this decidedly noninterpretivist and socially
oriented way of thinking about what it means to have a Constitution,
and what it means to practice in the area of constitutional law. And if
so, we have lost as well as gained from this interpretive turn. There
may or may not be points to be won-politically-from insisting that
55. See DWORKIN, supra note 3, at 62.
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it is possible to read our constitutional texts in a sufficiently subtle
and supple way so as to permit most of the results reached on at-the-
time noninterpretivist grounds. But to reap the benefit of this gain,
we have had to refocus constitutional attention on the very text-
albeit a more ecumenical, less constricting, more modernized text, but
still, nevertheless, a text-that those same noninterpretivists initially
found too constraining. With the text as our relentless focus-no
matter how hermeneutical our interpretive method with respect to
it-we risk losing our sense of the Constitution as imposing upon us,
fundamentally, an ethical duty to respond morally to injustice in the
world, rather than to inconsistencies in our traditions, texts, and
prejudicial pre-commitments. We lose the possibility that the
Constitution is at bottom a mandate to do justice and hence what it
means to have a Constitution-to engage in the work of
reconstituting-through moral interaction with our social world,
rather than through cogitative, interpretive moves through texts.
III. THE TURN AWAY FROM CONSTITUTIONAL UNIQUENESS
Justice Marshall, in Marbury v. Madison 6 and again in
McCulloch v. Maryland,57 as well as Justice Warren, in Brown v.
Board of Education, both found it illuminating that they were
interpreting a Constitution, and both gathered from that fact that
they had some measure of interpretive power in deciding the cases
before them that otherwise might be legitimately denied them.5 8 Both
grounded their vividly hermeneutical reading of the Constitution, in
other words, at least partly, on the Constitution's uniqueness or
singularity or, just, peculiarity-it is a law, but not an ordinary law. 9
One of the turns inspired by Gadamer's elucidation of hermeneutical
interpretation, I think, is a turn away from this Marshall-Warren
tradition. If Gadamer is right, then Marshall and Warren were both
wrong to think that their necessary participation in the construction
of the Constitution's meaning was in any way dependent upon the
56. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
57. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
58. In Marbury, Chief Justice Marshall grounded the interpretive exercise of judicial
review on the constitutional status of the law requiring application. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 137. In
McCulloch v. Maryland, he famously declared it to be a "Constitution we are expounding," in
the course of rendering a decision not readily squared with the document's language or history.
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 407. In Brown, Chief Justice Warren declared that "we cannot turn the
clock back to 1868," in the course of minimizing the relevance of history to the determination of
the constitutionality of segregatory state laws. 347 U.S. 483, 492 (1954).
59. See McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 407 ("It is a Constitution we are expounding.").
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Constitution's uniqueness. All texts, not just the constitutional ones,
require the hermeneutical reading Marshall and Warren bestowed on
the Constitution. Interpretive agility in the constitutional context is
required by the Constitution's textualism-a trait it shares with every
other law and every other verbal formulation imaginable -not by the
Constitution's uniqueness. The openness of the Constitution to
hermeneutic interpretation is what it shares universally with all other
texts. There is nothing unique about it.
The Gadamerian interpretive turn has turned us, then, among
much else, away from the possibility that Warren and Marshall might
have had it right. If they were right, we have a slight paradox: it may
be that Gadamer's account of hermeneutical interpretation so
perfectly matches the hermeneutic of constitutional law, not because
of the Constitution's universal qualities-its textualism-but rather
because of the Constitution's uniqueness: it may be only because it
was a constitution they were interpreting that their method of reading
it so nicely fits Gadamerian accounts of interpretation. And, it may
also be the case (contra Warren and Marshall) that what the
Constitution has, uniquely and peculiarly, that other legal texts do
not, are nontextual qualities.
The Constitution has a lot in common with other legal texts-like
other legal texts, it is composed of words that command, with
sanctions, and so on. But unlike those texts, it is also, in some ways,
much like some things that are not texts at all, at least in any sort of
obvious way: it is sort of like Mount Rushmore or the Vietnam War
Memorial. It may be that Gadamerian interpretation sounds so much
like constitutional interpretation, not because the Constitution is a
text and Gadamer has correctly described what it means to interpret a
text, but, rather, because in some ways the Constitution is not a text
at all, and Gadamer has correctly described what it means to interpret
texts that also have the peculiar property of having nontextual
attributes that also are generative of meaning, such as national
memorials or monuments.60
National monuments, such as the Vietnam War Memorial, do
indeed invite communicative, communitarian, dialogic, open dis-
course on its meaning. For example, "Is the monument a testament
to our shame, or our courage?" "Does the monument symbolize a
60. Gadamer himself does not explicitly extend his hermeneutic method to monuments; he
does, though, extend it to "absolute music" and "abstract art." GADAMER, supra note 5, at 91-
92.
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historical disaster?" "Is the meaning of the names engraved upon the
monument found in the acts of courage and sacrifice they represent,
or in the names not included, who also died as a result of the war?"
"Is the Memorial an ugly, nihilistic slash in the ground, as its critics
complained at the time of its proposal, or an elegant tribute to the
loss of life and the families' terrible and terrifying grief?" Obviously,
the monument doesn't say. Furthermore, the sculptor, Maya Li, also
does not say. It would be wildly inappropriate for Li to just tell us
what the monument "means." Intentionalism, here, would clearly be
misplaced-and it would be misplaced even though the sculptor is
living, capable of communicating, singular, and no doubt had
intentions regarding the monument and its meaning. We-every
generation, every visitor to Washington-say what it means. And we
say it, in some way, collectively; we do, as a nation, give the Vietnam
War Memorial an evolving meaning. The monument is there, after
all, in part, to inspire a conversation about its meaning-and the
meaning of the war that prompted its creation.
Debates over the Constitution's meaning are sometimes, in some
ways, and toward some ends, debates about the meaning of the
Constitution-as-text and the Constitution-as-law. But debates over
the Constitution's meaning at other times, in other ways, and toward
other ends, might be more like the debates about the meaning of the
Vietnam War Memorial than they are like debates over the meaning
of a contract, a statute, a precedent, or Moby Dick. The debates
about the meaning of the Vietnam War Memorial have a distinctively
audience-participation flavor, but it has that flavor, perhaps, because
of its status as a national memorial, rather than its status as a "text."
It is entirely appropriate and desirable, and perhaps inevitable, that
the debate over the Memorial's meaning be a consultative
conversation involving the community that receives the monument-
rather than a directive from sculptor to audience. Likewise, some of
the debates about the Construction's meaning might be on a par:
consultative dialogic conversations involving the community that
received the document memorializing an ambiguous moment in
national history, with a meaning that cries out for constant
reinterpretation. If that is right, then the Gadamerian, collaborative,
dialogic, argumentative, and above all anti-intentionalist quality of
our constitutional conversations owe as much to the nontextual and
nonlegal attributes of the Constitution, as to its textual and legal
functions and contours. We should not falsely generalize from those
conversations to the conclusion that what is true of constitutional
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interpretative dialogue must be true of the interpretive debates over
the meaning of all laws-from contracts to ordinances to statutes, and
even less over the meaning of all texts, from advertising slogans to
Moby Dick. The Constitution has distinctive features, and one of
those distinctions might be its nontextual "monumentalism." We
might engage in Gadamerian conversations about the Constitution's
meaning, not because it is a "text," but because in important respects,
it is not.
IV. THE TURN AWAY FROM CONSEQUENTIALIST CRITICISM OF
LAW
What does it mean to criticize a law? One possible meaning is
that the critic assesses the world after the law is enacted, compares it
with the world before the law was enacted, and then evaluates the
law's consequences. Is the world a better or a worse place because of
newly enacted caps on punitive damages in tort actions? Is the social
world improved, post-Roe,1 or Brown,62 or Casey63? Should we have
more shareholder liability than we have? What would be the
consequences of abolishing limited liability? One sees not a trace of
this sort of critical activity in Gadamer's writings on law, as far as I
know. One of the surest signs of Gadamer's influence is that one sees
almost none of it in the writings of critical scholars who have been
most influenced by him. One of the turns unambiguously occasioned
by the reception of Gadamerian thought in critical legal theory, in
other words-perhaps the most obvious and perhaps for that reason
the least remarked upon-is the turn away from consequentialist
criticism of law.
There is no mystery here explaining why-indeed, in the search
for reasons, there is an embarrassment of riches. The sort of
consequentialist criticism described above is almost a parody of the
neo-Kantian model of social thought and criticism that Gadamer (and
Habermas, and Foucault, and Derrida-this is the shared ground
between them) first criticized, somewhat vilified, and then, in
Gadamer's case, sought to supplant with a hermeneutical approach to
understanding and criticism.64  Straightforward, consequentialist
61. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
62. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
63. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
64. This is the subject of Wickham's enlightening article Foucault and Gadamer: Like
Apples and Oranges Passing in the Night, which reluctantly concludes that this overlapping area
is small. See Gary Wickham, Foucault and Gadamer: Like Apples and Oranges Passing in the
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criticism of the sort suggested above is precisely the target-the
wrong-headed approach-of Gadamerian thought, in its critical
mode: it is what interpretation seeks to dethrone.65 It has, bluntly,
every pre-postmodern sin in the book: it assumes a subject-the
critic-apart from and over the object of knowledge and criticism-
the law. 66  More specifically, it assumes a disinterested subject
potentially free of his or her own prejudices when engaged in the
work of characterizing and evaluating consequences. 67 It employs an
unpleasant method of criticism no different from methods employed
by technological, bureaucratic manipulators. It assumes a law
unambiguous in meaning and impact.68 It rests on a naive, and false,
if "enlightened," commitment to the transparency and availability of
social "facts." More fundamentally, and I think for Gadamerians
most fatally, it relies on a distinction-an ontological boundary, so to
speak-between the legal text and its worldly consequences: to
evaluate the consequences of a law we are going to have to separate
consequences from text and then use the former to critique the latter.
This separation, for Gadamer and Gadamerians, is an untenable one,
and undesirable as well. One cannot separate "worldly conse-
quences" from "law" because one cannot separate the "world" from
the "text." The "world," both natural and social, is not apart from the
descriptions and regulations of it that occur through texts, including
legal texts. Criticism of law, in short, has to be interpretive, not
consequentialist, if it is to occur at all.
What should we make of this interpretive turn-a turn that
carries the substantial risk, I will suggest in a moment, of turning the
critic's attention away from the social world? First of all, as a number
of commentators in this Symposium make clear, the conservative
implications of this turn are both clear and worrisome to anyone,
including Gadamerians, concerned with the state of contemporary
critical theory: if the sort of consequentialist criticism suggested above
is just not possible, and if it is not possible (in part) because of the
critic's necessary "embeddedness" in the social milieu he or she is
criticizing, then it is not clear that any sort of deep criticism of law,
consequentialist or otherwise, is possible at all. There is no vantage
point apart from the facilitative prejudices and social under-
Night, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 913, 913-15 (2000).
65. See GADAMER, supra note 5, at xxix-xxx.
66. Id. at 329.
67. Id. at 327-29.
68. Id. at 325-27.
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standings-prejudices shared by the critic and legislator both-from
which those prejudices and social understandings might themselves be
judged, and it may well be that criticism of law without the deeper
critique is going to be worse than useless. This is the troubling
Burkean implication of Gadamerian thought that Gadamerian critical
theorists, such as Jay Mootz, 69 Stephen Feldman 0 and even Allan
Hutchinson," so energetically seek to rebut in their articles for this
Symposium. If interpretation is facilitated by shared communal
prejudice and precommitment, and if interpretation is virtually all
there is, then it really is hard to see how criticism ever occurs. It may
well be flatly impossible. Worse yet, this might be just what the
relatively conservative Gadamer believed-in which case he is an odd
hero for radical legal critics.
On the other side of the critical ledger, so to speak, Gadamerian
critical scholars point out that hermeneutical forms of understanding,
initial appearances to the contrary notwithstanding, do make possible
(or, show why it is possible to have) a certain form of "inside-the-
loop," situated critical stance. 2 The genuinely hermeneutical stance
toward any text is distinctively and necessarily open, and what that
openness allows is a shifting of the critic's framework, or horizons, so
as to make sense of the text with which he or she is in dialogue. 3 The
result is a transformation of the critic: the critic might now view his or
her own facilitating prejudices, or pre-commitments, in a new light-
the light made possible by the fusion of text's and reader's horizons.
The critical, hermeneutical reader, then, will emerge from the
experience with a transformed and potentially more critical stance
toward his or her own enabling pre-conceptions-as well as a
transformed and potentially more critical stance toward the
community that shares those pre-conceptions. What the herme-
neuticist cannot do is the sort of consequentialist assessments so
treasured by pre-postmodernists. What he or she can do, though, is
constantly open himself or herself to the possibility of reforming and
transforming his or her own critical horizons. That is the bargain.
69. See Mootz, supra note 7, at 925-27.
70. See Feldman, How to Be Critical, supra note 7, at 893-96.
71. See Hutchinson, supra note 1, at 1016-19.
72. The most eloquent short description of this is possibly Fiss, supra note 45. Dworkin's
Law's Empire is a standard book-length attempt to defend Gadamerian adjudication. See
DWORKIN, supra note 3.
73. See GADAMER, supra note 5, at 302-07.
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To be blunt, I am not sure it is a good bargain. Look at some of
the not-so-hidden terms. First, the transformation-the growth of
critical capacity; the changed being -all occur in the critic. The result
of radical critical thought, hermeneutically styled, is a transformed
critic. It is the critic that is transformed by the sort of reading the
interpretive turn illuminates; not the world. Second, the world is
pretty thoroughly abandoned in this hermeneutical revolution. What
Gadamer provides us, after all, is an understanding of the relations
between author, reader, and text-and the striking suggestion that
emerges from it is a redistribution of responsibility and participation
between those three entities, for the creation of meaning.7 4 The
reader's role is highlighted and expanded, along with his or her
preconceptions and horizons, in the creation of the text's meaning.
But what is pretty clearly left out of this "triad""7 is the world.
The Gadamerian bargain, in other words, gives us an under-
standing of how a text's meaning and a text's reader can both be
transformed through the same hermeneutic event. But that is clearly
not adequate to the task of explaining how, or whether, we can
criticize the effect of law on our social world. It is nice-I suppose-
that reading a text of a law might transform an open reader, and that
the reader might have an impact on the text's received meaning at the
same time. And-surely-if that sort of reading is the only possible
kind of reading worth bothering with, then it is also clear that courts,
when doing the work of figuring out what a law means, ought to
acknowledge their own participation in the process. But none of that
gets anywhere near addressing the question of a law's social value.
To do the latter work-to decide whether a legal "text," in its much
belittled, positivistic, command-with-consequences mode, is one
worth having or one we ought to chuck-we have to look elsewhere
than the tripartite Bermuda triangle of reader, text, and author. We
have to look at the world and somehow ascertain whether it is for
good or bad. In its more extreme modes, the emphasis by
Gadamerians on the critic-as-reader, and the reader's transformed
consciousness-all the talk of fused horizons-after a hermeneutic
encounter with a text, and particularly the construction of that
consciousness as the exemplar and measure of all things critical,
seems precious, even fetishistic, and to be very old-fashioned, it also
seems downright bourgeois. There is surely something to the Marxist
74. Id.
75. Valauri, supra note 9, at 1090.
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complaint that the world cries out for change, not just under-
standing.76
There are two further problems, however, with the provocative
attempts by Gadamer's radical followers to reap from Gadamer's
writings a prescription for radical change, even assuming the change
in question is one limited to the changed consciousness of the critic
and the changed meaning of the text. The first is that although
Gadamer has given us a powerful-indeed in some sense unas-
sailable- account of what it means to glean meaning from a text,77 he
gives us no way to assess whether the transformation of meaning
affected in either the text or the reader by the hermeneutical
encounter is a desirable one. The Afghanistan Taliban, 8 for example,
is a radical return to tradition from a secularized culture, and one
brought about through the mechanisms of textual reinterpretations as
well as armed combat, but perhaps one that humane proponents of
either radicalism or traditionalism, or proponents of the desirability
of fusing the two, would not want to endorse. Likewise, and more
modestly, the transformation in consciousness that might be
occasioned by a Western reader's open and accepting reading of, for
example, the marital rape exemption in the criminal codes of our fifty
states, might not be a transformation we ought to desire. Even the
transformation in consciousness occasioned by Brown and its
aftermath-the crossing of literal, political, spiritual, psychic, and
racial boundaries, which in some ways, I think, is a transformation of
consciousness that is almost perfectly exemplary of the sort of
Gadamerian, horizontal movement toward justice arguably facilitated
by open and honest cross-boundary dialogue-was not entirely
laudatory. Derrick Bell reminds us, for example, that one
consequence of the decision was the newfound consciousness among
the black intelligentsia, committed to integration, that blackness is
just not good enough-the same message, differently delivered, that
the architects of Brown sought to bury.79
Second, however, and perhaps more important, even if the
transformation in consciousness and in textual meaning occasioned by
76. See Karl Marx, Theses on Feuerbach (10th Thesis), in MARX AND ENGELS: BASIC
WRITINGS ON POLITICS AND PHILOSOPHY 243, 245 (Lewis Feur ed., 1959).
77. See GADAMER, supra note 5, at xxi, xxv.
78. On the Taliban generally, and its dubious connections to Islamic fundamentalism, see
William T. Vollman, Across the Divide, NEW YORKER, May 15, 2000, at 58.
79. See DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL
JUSTICE (1987).
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the hermeneutic encounter is in some sense desirable, as well as
radical and liberating, that transformation still tells us nothing of the
law's worldly affects. Consider, for example, the reader, as well as
legislator, whose consciousness has been transformed in a good way,
perhaps even raised, by texts, describing, say, the harms occasioned
by marital rape. Perhaps that reader has then been moved to reform
or abolish rape exemptions, thereby creating a new and improved
legal text. There may have been a quite happy and transformative
fusing of feminist, reformist, legislative, and criminological horizons,
resulting in a transformed legal text, a rape law without any
exemptions for married people, or the Violence Against Women Act
("VAWA"). 80 But shouldn't these transformed readers and critics
know and care about whether or not there have been any successful
prosecutions under these reformed criminal texts? Isn't the bottom
line value of the transformation of consciousness occasioned by
horizon-fusing texts somewhat diminished if there has been no
correlative real world change? This is not to deny that the effect on
consciousness of something like VAWA is a consequence that
matters-for better or worse. But the change in consciousness is
surely one consequence among others that matter-the others that
matter here are the number of rapes, arrests, and convictions before
and after these laws are changed, what happens to the victims before
and after, what happens to the defendants, what happens to the
overburdened penal system, the impact of the law on various
subcommunities, and so on. The consequences of a law-a marital
rape exemption, or the repeal of a marital rape exemption, or
VAWA, or a court decision finding VAWA unconstitutional8l- and
not just its interpretive and transformative potency, matter, and the
assessment of those consequences depends mightily on our ability to
acquire those facts, assess them, and respond appropriately-meaning
justly. To do that at all we have to redirect the critic's gaze away from
the text, no matter how construed, and toward the world the text
affects.
V. THE TURN AWAY FROM NONTEXTUAL SOCIAL CRITICISM
The greatest danger, by far, of the interpretive turn in critical
legal scholarship is that the turn toward hermeneutic understanding
80. Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, Title IV, 108 Stat. 1902-55
(codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.).
81. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
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has turned critical attention not only away from the consequences of
a law but, more broadly, away from social injustice. Like the turn
from consequentialist criticism of law, the turn away from social
criticism, if it has occurred, is a consequence of the Bermuda triangle-
like effect of the hermeneutic subject of inquiry: text, reader, and
author exhaust the world. The central Gadamerian insight, after all,
concerns that triangle, not the world: the reader participates in the
creation of a text's meaning, Gadamer teaches us, albeit not in a
manner that strips either the text or the author of their importance. 82
The trouble arises when we overgeneralize from this interpretive
insight. If the text we are interpreting turns out to be everywhere and
everything-if all understanding is hermeneutic-then criticism as
well as understanding proceeds by this hermeneutic path. When we
fuse these universalizing insights, I fear, what we are left with might
be Alice going down the rabbit hole: she is in a virtual whirlwind of
texts, authors, and horizons that shift and fuse with every passing
second; all of which she greets, in those first chapters anyway, with an
enchanting openness-an openness to mind-expanding texts, interpre-
tations of texts, and language-, text-, and story-spouting authors,
tellers, and writers (to say nothing of mind-expanding drugs, to which
she is also quite open)-but she's left the real world, with all of its
anxieties and troubles, pretty far behind.
As have, I am afraid, at least if appearances do not deceive, the
authors in this Symposium. What is missing from this Symposium on
Gadamer and critical legal theory is any social criticism, whether meta
or not. We do have some social problems in this world. But there is
nothing in this Symposium on the state of critical theory about the
staggering gap between rich and poor, or black and white, in this
country, or of the shameful global poverty suffered by most of the
world's inhabitants, or of the imminent ecological disaster our
excessive lifestyles court, or of the slaughter of innocents in points
abroad; or of a world still terrified of nuclear devices of our own
making. There is, to be sure, criticism, and discussion of criticism, of
various texts: criticism of hate speech, 3 of Supreme Court decisions,84
82. See GADAMER, supra note 5, at 340.
83. The only article in this Symposium to apply Gadamerian interpretive insights to a
concrete legal problem is R. George Wright, Traces of Violence: Gadamer, Habermas, and the
Hate Speech Problem, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 991 (2000). I think the argument in that article is
successful, and indeed, it suggests a larger project: any number of First Amendment issues and
problems might be elucidated through a Gadamerian analysis. My concern is not with this
article or its scope, but with the fact that it is the only one of the sort in the Symposium. I also
wonder how a Gadamerian analysis of race relations more generally might proceed. Dallmayr's
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of constitutional doctrine (although not even as much of that as one
might have anticipated). But there is virtually no criticism of the
social conditions themselves, particularly of social conditions which
cannot in some way be funneled into the textual paradigm. There is
no criticism, in this Symposium on legal criticism, that has as its object
anything other than a text. But the society that needs criticizing-our
own-is not exhausted by its texts.
Now of course, the absence of social criticism may be in part a
function of the subject of this Symposium, which is not "Gadamer and
Social Criticism," but rather, "Gadamer and Legal Criticism," and
laws, after all, are texts, or at least it is a plausible enough sounding
claim that they are. But that is not a fully satisfying reply, for two
reasons. First, the topic is chosen for a reason, and the reason may be
that even Gadamerians might suspect that while Gadamerian thought
can arguably provide a basis for legal criticism (although perhaps not
radical legal criticism) it just cannot provide a basis for radical social
critique. Forging Gadamer with critical legal thought requires some
massaging, but providing a Gadamerian account of social criticism
would be a little more like forcing the proverbial square peg into the
round hole, as Habermas argued some time ago.85 Habermas's
complaint-that the Gadamerian reader is so beholden to cultural
tradition as to render criticism of one's culture impossible, thus giving
hermeneutics an inescapably conservative tilt86-is a considerably
greater threat to the possibility of social criticism than legal criticism.
Legal criticism, after all, at least in its everyday, work-a-world,
ordinary variety, just is beholden to social tradition; nobody really
expects much else of it. We criticize laws, when we do so, routinely,
by reference to shared moral beliefs, traditions, intuitions, or other
laws that are more deeply embedded in the social fabric. The
challenge, for legal criticism, is to show how this sort of ordinary
criticism can ever be radical-can go to the root and critique the
traditions, shared beliefs, and so forth, that otherwise form the
foundation for ordinary legal reform. Much more is expected,
though, of social criticism, and if Habermas is right that the
piece on boundaries and borders presents some provocative suggestions, but that is not its
primary focus. Dallmayr, supra note 9.
84. See Hutchinson, supra note 1, at 1020-31; Taylor, supra note 6, at 1110-15.
85. See Dallmayr, supra note 9, at 839-43; Feldman, How to Be Critical, supra note 7, at
901-06.
86. See Dallmayr, supra note 9, at 839-43; Feldman, How to Be Critical, supra note 7, at
901-06.
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implications of Gadamerian thought is that the much more that's
required is impossible,"' that does not leave much room for a radical
reinterpretation of Gadamer, even for purposes of radical-critical
approaches to law.
The second reason, though, that this response-that one should
not, after all, expect to find social criticism in a symposium on the
topic of Gadamer and legal criticism-does not satisfy, is that it
unduly cribs the role of the legal critic. Legal criticism might of
course mean criticism of law, which might then mean criticism of legal
texts, which might in turn require understanding of those texts, which
might then require Gadamerian hermeneutics. But it should not
mean only that. Legal criticism might also refer to criticism of social
reality from the distinctive perspective of a lawyer, someone with a
legalist commitment, someone committed to law. The "legal critic"
could mean, in other words, not just the critic of law, but also the
critic of society who is, simply, a lawyer: "legal" might modify the
word "critic," rather than designate the subject of critique. The
lawyer-critic, the social critic trained in law, might have something
distinctive to offer by way of criticism of social reality, by virtue of his
or her legal horizons. Might not it be the case, for example, that
wealth disparities, both national and global, violate moral norms of
justice encoded in our constitutional commitment to the equal
protection of the law? Might not the flagrant culpability of tobacco
executives in perpetuating addiction to a product known by them to
be lethal, violate a legally honed sense of retributive justice? Might
there be forms of social interaction-such as, for example, in homes
or on schoolyards-that are presently in some fundamental way
lawless, as well as atextual, and thus cry out for social critique from
just those community members who are in some way committed to
legal ideals? Legal training and legal intuitions, and the sort of
judgment to which that training gives rise, could conceivably
contribute to social critique, where the subject of the critique is in
some way a form of injustice facilitated by a failing or absence of
lawfulness. Once encountered, and confronted, an encounter
between a lawyer-critic and such a site of social injustice might yield a
socially and morally profitable fusing, or blending, of horizons. But
to see such a world first requires the critic to look beyond texts, to the
worlds that exist in texts' shadows.
87. See Dallmayr, supra note 9, at 840-41.
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VI. THE TURN AWAY FROM SYMPATHY
Is our capacity for moral judgment and action-and hence for
criticism-literally produced by our language? Is it linguistically
constructed? Or, is our capacity for language-and for criticism-a
product of a more basic mutual trust; a trust established early in life,
which lays the foundation for sympathy, and hence for moral
judgment and language?
The interpretive turn has directed critical legal scholars quite
emphatically toward an affirmative response to the first question and
a negative response to the second, and therefore to a particular view
of what it means to engage in moral, and hence critical, inquiry. The
moral critic criticizes, basically, by pitting text against text.88
Interpretation, after all, is the foundational activity, of which criticism,
like understanding, is a certain sort. To criticize, then, just is to
criticize a text, and to criticize a text, in turn, is to test it by holding it
up to the light or darkness cast by other and perhaps conflicting
texts-texts composed of traditions, of learnings, of beliefs, and of
contrasting or conflicting interpretations of the text being criticized.
The "critical moment," for the hermeneuticist, is the moment when a
text is woven into a preexisting fabric of texts: this is what it is, not
only to interpret, but also to converse, to judge, to grow, and to
criticize. The same, then, holds for criticism of law, as well as the
radical critical enterprise described by Feldman:89 to criticize legal
texts is to hold one text-say, the Court's decision in Dred Scott9°-
against the fabric of some other set of texts-say the journalistic,
political, or philosophical writings of the abolitionist natural lawyers,
or their particular reading of the Constitution. The former might
then be found wanting-as lacking a decent interpretive foundation,
or at least, as not as strongly supported by some tradition's basic
texts, as might have been a decision going the other way. Dred Scott,
on this view, was a moral disaster, because it was an interpretive
disaster-as evidenced, perhaps, in part, by the fact that it took an
extended period of violence rather than interpretive evolution to
rectify.
Thus, the interpretive turn has turned critical legal scholars not
only toward one type of criticism-interpretive criticism-but more
basically, toward a view of what it is to make moral judgments, and
88. See Feldman, How to Be Critical, supra note 7, at 897-99.
89. Id.
90. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
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even what it is to be moral. Moral criticism is a form of interpretive
activity. To criticize, from a moral perspective, is to interpret, and to
interpret texts is to do so from the perspective of a tapestry of one's
community's cultural sources-traditions, beliefs, prejudices, texts.
How to assess this interpretive turn? Well, as I have now noted
obsessively, there is an obvious and much remarked upon
conservative tilt to the turn toward this description of our moral
capacity. If we criticize everything-including legal texts like Dred
Scott or Morrison-on the basis of other texts, themselves a product
of the very traditions that render the texts being criticized intelligible,
then our criticism is obviously going to be no deeper, or better, than
our traditions: far more texts, and traditions, suggested the
constitutionality of slavery and the constitutionality of the Fugitive
Slave Act than otherwise, and likewise, "traditions" dating to Biblical
times exert a gravitational pull suggesting the unconstitutionality of
VAWA. The Gadamerian account of moral criticism, and indeed, the
Gadamerian account of the moral point of view, as so utterly
beholden to the interpreter's and the interpreter's community's
traditions, seems to carry all the pitfalls of the worst sort of moral
relativism: if we criticize texts and practices on the basis of traditions,
how do we criticize the traditions? As noted above, the same concern
is reflected in the Habermas-Gadamer debate: Gadamerian herme-
neutics, Habermas argued, can never serve as a basis for radical
criticism of a society's texts, because hermeneutical interpretation is
itself dependent upon the very traditions that render the text being
criticized intelligible. 91 More recently Richard Wolin, writing in the
New Republic, puts basically the same critique in a harsher light: the
reliance on the community's Zeitgeist as both the enabler and limit of
criticism, the muting of the individual voice and the amplification of
the community, tradition, and history as constitutive of individual
voice, Wolin charges, have sinister, fascistic, perhaps Naziistic,
overtones.92 In this Symposium, the same worry has prompted
Stephen Feldman to be concerned that the hermeneuticist who seeks
to be critical is hindered by his own traditions, blinders, and biases;93
Hutchinson to worry that Gadamer has closer affinities to Justice
Scalia who after all quite explicitly refers to tradition as the measure
91. See Dallmayr, supra note 9, at 835-43 (commenting on Jurgen Habermas, A Review of
Gadamer's Truth and Method, in UNDERSTANDING AND SOCIAL INQUIRY (Fred R. Dallmayr
& Thomas A. McCarthy eds., 1977)); Feldman, How to Be Critical, supra note 7, at 901-06.
92. See Richard Wolin, Untruth and Method, NEW REPUBLIC, May 15, 2000, at 36, 36-45.
93. See Feldman, How to Be Critical, supra note 7, at 893-96.
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of unconstitutionality under the Due Process Clause94-or to
Dworkin, whose conception of evolutionary, reformative adjudication
bears a strong resemblance and owes an explicit debt to Gadamerian
hermeneutics,95 than to any sort of radical tradition; Wickham to
worry that Gadamer and Foucault have little or no overlapping
ground;96 and all of them to search for a reading of Gadamer that is
facilitative of radical, rather than ameliorative, reform.
I do not know whether any of the authors here have successfully
rendered a radical re-reading of Gadamer's Truth and Method.
Again, what I want to highlight instead is that this turn toward an
understanding of the moral point of view as necessarily embedded in
text, tradition, and natural language-and hence, of criticism as a
form of interpretation -is a turning away from other possible ways of
understanding the moral point of view, from where it emanates, and
how it might facilitate legal criticism. The contributors in this
Symposium occasionally write as though the only alternative
understanding of the moral point of view to have emerged from the
Western cultural tradition, to the Gadamerian approach they are here
advocating, is the austere, categorical, Kantian imperative, with its
harsh splits between reason and faith, passion and rationality, human
feeling and moral judgment.97 But that is clearly not so.
Specifically, the turn to interpretive understandings of moral
judgement constitutes not only a turn away from Kantian conceptions
of Right, but also constitutes a turn away from what might be called,
following Adam Smith, "sentimental" 98 conceptions of the human
good, as well. To react morally to a human situation may be, at
bottom, a sentimental response, grounded in sympathetic reactions to
the physical or psychic suffering or well-being of fellow sentient
creatures, and then informed and cultivated by reason. Such a
sentimental, Smithian understanding of moral judgment, I think, has
close affinities with the hermeneutic one-it too is profoundly non-
Kantian; it too envisions moral judgment as an interactive, even
communal response derived from and situated within our social
being; and it too relies upon rather than rejects what Martha
Nussbaum and other neo-Smithians refer to as the "moral emotions" 99
94. See Hutchinson, supra note 1, at 1025-26.
95. Id. at 1024.
96. See Wickham, supra note 64, at 943.
97. See, e.g., Dallmayr, supra note 9, at 825.
98. See ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 3-5 (1759).
99. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, POETIC JUSTICE: THE LITERARY IMAGINATION AND PUBLIC
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rather than reason narrowly conceived. But for modern sentimen-
talists, it is sentiment and sympathy for the suffering of others' 00-
human capacities, universally shared, not a categorical imperative,
but also not a culture's traditions, texts, prejudices, or shared
beliefs-that constitutes the heart of the moral response, a response
which is then refined by, or distorted by, or crushed by, or perverted
by, a community's shared, taught, disseminated beliefs. The
sympathetic response to the pain or suffering of others, is, for
sentimentalists, what does and should guide our critical responses to
our own community's shared texts, as well as its laws, prejudices,
beliefs, and practices. It is also what guides, and what should guide,
our day-to-day moral judgements, and thus our day-to-day criticisms
of law as well.
Once one is aware of the sentimentalist alternative to text-bound
hermeneutical understandings of morality on the one hand, and
community-denying, categorical, austere Kantianism on the other,
one sees it everywhere. First of all, its history as a philosophical
tradition is not negligible: moral sentimentality was at the heart of the
"Scottish Enlightenment," of which Smith was himself a member. 101it
is also this view of the moral capacity that animated Mill's famously
non-Benthamic utilitarianism,12 as well as the contemporary noneco-
nomic utilitarianism of Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum.1 3 We
also hear echoes of it in the teachings of some developmental
psychologists, who have long insisted that the foundation for a moral
point of view is laid in the early years, and possibly the first few
months of life-well before the acquisition of a natural language: a
well-tended baby learns that when he cries, his hunger is satiated, his
thirst quenched, his diaper changed, his discomfort alleviated, and
thereby learns trust. T. Berry Brazelton-the popular and accom-
plished Harvard pediatrician-has commented that he can judge by
his interactions with three month olds whether they are at risk of
serious sociopathology as adults' 0 -perhaps an exaggerated claim,
LIFE 72-77 (1995).
100. See id.
101. 8 ROUTLEDGE, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 815 (Edward Craig ed., 1998).
102. See JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM (Prometheus Books 1987) (1863).
103. See MARTHA NUSSBAUM, supra note 99; MARTHA NUSSBAUM, LOVE'S KNOWLEDGE:
ESSAYS ON PHILOSOPHY AND LITERATURE (1990); MARTHA NUSSBAUM, SEX AND SOCIAL
JUSTICE (1999); AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM (1999); AMARTYA SEN, ON
ETHICS AND ECONOMICS (1987); THE QUALITY OF LIFE (Amartya Sen & Martha Nussbaum
eds., 1993); AMARTYA SEN, UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND (1982).
104. Dr. Brazelton has reported:
In addition, when a mother is undernourished, she is more likely to be depressed, have
20001
HeinOnline -- 76 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1159 2000-2001
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
but not one to dismiss lightly. But more to the point, our daily moral
interactions-the tenor of our responses to the suffering of others-
feel more basic, more physical, and I would say more universalist,
than they feel textual, or traditional, and the multitude of critical
judgments, whether of others, of laws, of beliefs, or of traditions, that
we routinely render, on small and large matters, likewise feels more
like the mortar from which traditions are formed, than vice versa.
The moral response feels more and perhaps is more humane,
sympathetic, sentimental, and bodily, than is allowed by either the
textualism of the hermeneuticist, or the super-rationalism of Kant.
Finally, it may well be sentimentality, rather than either text or
categorical imperatives, that prompts genuine, and radical, moral
growth. If we are going to come to accept an ethical imperative not to
eat animals, for example, it may well be that we come to accept that
imperative not through either Kantian logic or through reinterpre-
tations of our community's texts (although neither could hurt), but
rather, through abrupt confrontations with the violence we are
visiting upon sentient creatures-a violence that the South African
writer J.M. Coetzee has recently compared to the Holocaust.105 In a
book review' °6 of Coetzee's work concerning the inner lives of
animals, Ian Hacking remarks upon a passage in a novel by the same
author, in which a farm boy is confronted with the violence of animal
husbandry.107 In the novel, the boy is shocked by the obvious
similarity -theretofore unnoticed by him-between the animal's
entrails and his own, a sudden awareness that sickens him.108 One
might, of course, read the passage as about a boy's interpretations of
the "text" provided by the animal's entrails. But Hacking does not
read it that way. He reads it as conveying a description of a boy's
experience not of conflicting rights traditions-a hermeneutic expe-
rience of shifting textual horizons-and even less of a boy's reasoned
a poor self-image, and a feeling of hopelessness, all of which is conveyed in her
interactions with her child. In "face to face" research I have done on babies' responses
to their mothers' depression, effects can be seen as early as 3 to 6 months of age. Baby
girls tend to react in an apathetic manner while boys respond to their depressed
mother with increased energy that can be characterized as violent.
Better Nutrition and Health for Children Act of 1993: Hearing on S. 1614 Before the Senate
Subcomm. on Nutrition and Investigations, Senate Comm. on Agric., Nutrition and Forestry,
103d Cong. 236 (1994) (testimony of Dr. T. Berry Brazelton). Dr. Brazelton is a professor
at Harvard Medical School and has authored several popular books on infant care.
105. See J.M. COETZEE, THE LIVES OF ANIMALS (1999).
106. See Ian Hacking, Our Fellow Animals, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, June 29, 2000, at 20, 20-26
(reviewing COETZEE, supra note 105).
107. See id. (quoting J.M. COETZEE, BOYHOOD (1997)).
108. See id.
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deduction from a categorical imperative, but rather, of the boy's
shock of recognition, and the sentiment that shock engendered: the
boy realizes his commonality with the slaughtered animal and quite
directly sympathizes with the animal's pain. 109 That is, simply, a
different sort of experience and leads, I think, to a different sort of
critical judgment than the hermeneutical experience of meshing
conflicting traditions or texts. I see no reason to conflate them by
subsuming all mental processes under the rubric of "interpretation"
and all experience under the umbrella of text.
VII. THE TURN TOWARD INTERPRETATION AS THE TELOS OF
HUMAN LIFE
The most puzzling turn, to my mind, taken by hermeneuticists is
toward an insistence on interpretation as the universal, ever present,
always engaged in, end, means, activity, goal, and condition of human
life. We are not only "all interpretivists," as Tom Grey opined twenty
years ago,110 but apparently we are all interpretivists all of the time,
maybe even when we sleep. We are simply always interpreting, no
matter what else we think we are doing. When we are conversing,
arguing, reading, adjudicating, or criticizing, we are interpreting. We
are also interpreting when we are nowhere near written or oral texts:
we are interpreting when we are throwing a baseball, apparently
because throwing the baseball has meaning for us, otherwise, Stephen
Feldman asks, why else would we do it, and if it has meaning, then we
must be interpreting as we do it."' We are interpreting when we are
laboring, working, experiencing the natural world, eating, and
presumably when we are making love, giving birth, caring for
children, or dying, as well. The human animal is not essentially
political, as Aristotle thought.'12 The human animal is essentially and
always and universally, interpretive. It is pretty much all we do.
How should one assess this turn toward the interpretive telos? It
may or may not be that everything is one thing-maybe everything is
interpretation or maybe everything is water"3 or maybe everything is
power or maybe all sex is rape-but if so, we have to start
differentiating between the interpretations or the waters or the
109. See id.
110. See Grey, supra note 7, at 1.
111. See Feldman, How to Be Critical, supra note 7, at 904-05.
112. See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHics (D. Chase trans., 1911).
113. The philosopher was Thales, discussed in 9 ROUTLEDGE, supra note 101, at 322.
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powers, or the rapes; it is not clear what these totalizing claims are
doing. But there is another cost as well. What we have turned our
back on, once we have made this sort of totalizing claim, is not only
competing, but similarly universalist or essentialist sounding
depictions of the human being-e.g., human beings are essentially
political, essentially rational, essential brutish, and so forth. We also
turn our back on a pluralistic, multiple understanding of the ends of
human life and enterprise-meaning not that every individual makes
up his or her own, but that human life exhibits several ends. This
interpretive turn is in the end just reductionism.
One thing that is always sacrificed, when all is reduced to one, is
the common usage of words. It seems to me just odd to say that
Stephen Feldman is interpreting, when he is throwing a softball
around the back yard with his daughter, and equally odd to insist that
baseball throwing is an interpretive exercise because otherwise it
lacks meaning, and if it lacked meaning we would not do it. Giving
and interpreting instructions is surely part of the exercise of learning
to throw a ball. But when I watch my husband throw a lacrosse ball
with my sons, I am struck by the distinctively noninterpretive aspects
of the activity. After they get over the "put your opposite foot
forward" part, the activity of playing catch, it seems to me, is as
noninterpretive-mindless is not too strong a word-as could be: its
rhythmic, monotonous, hypnotic, unending, physical. I do not think it
is done toward the end of extracting meaning, even less, toward the
end of extracting a meaning in turn facilitated by the prejudices they
share, in turn informed by the Maryland tradition of playing lacrosse.
When they play backyard catch, it is toward the end of feeling the ball
arch as a result of one's physical motions and catching it in a net,
which is a pretty cool sensation, and having some success doing all of
that. It is toward the multiple ends of being, doing, moving, growing,
playing, and loving. It seems as noninterpretive to me as breast-
feeding-which can also be done right or not right, which also
requires following directions, but which is also toward a noninter-
pretive goal.
When my ten-year-old son plays the piano, he exhibits some
measure of technical proficiency, I think. But as proud of him as I
am, and for all of his recital experience, I have yet to hear him
actually interpret a piece of music. He will slavishly abide by dynamic
markings when he is reminded to, but for the most part he just races
through everything, the sooner to have it over with. He ought to
interpret the music, for sure, but he does not; at least not yet.
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I knit sweaters with intricate designs, and follow instructions to
do so. But I do not "interpret" the instructions and I certainly do not
want to interpret the instructions; if I have to interpret them, then the
instructions are not well done. In all three of my homey examples,
directions are being followed. In the first-throwing a lacrosse ball or
breast-feeding a baby-the directions require interpretation, but
toward ends that are not at all interpretive -playing catch or breast-
feeding are not activities directed toward the end of interpreting
anything. In the second, interpretation is most assuredly part of the
ideal-music, even very simple music, ought to be interpreted, rather
than played-but often is not. And in the third example,
interpretation is positively undesirable-the need for it evidences a
failure of communication rather than success.
Sometimes, of course, we interpret, and Gadamer has given us a
beautiful account of what it means to do so. We interpret Brown v.
Board of Education; we interpret Billy Budd, Sailor or Moby Dick;
we might interpret election returns-at least, we might interpret them
if we think voters are sending a message. Some interpretations of law
or literature or a musical score or an advertisement are indeed better
than others, and some are quite wonderful: when an interpretation is
wonderful, it is so I think because it has occasioned just the fusing of
horizons that Gadamerians applaud. Peter Goodrich's 114 and
Christopher Smith's1 5 contributions to this Symposium, I think, are
examples of wonderful interpretations: they exemplify Gadamerian
hermeneutics at its very best. Goodrich's interpretation of medieval
texts is potentially transformative, and even radical, precisely because
he has "fused horizons": his piece challenges modern rationalist
sensibilities about what it means to "judge" by juxtaposing it with the
medievalist's amourous judge deciding cases of love and flirta-
tiousness and doing so lovingly and flirtatiously. Smith's interpre-
tation of the Homeric texts on which Gadamer himself relied inspires
a reacquaintance with a collaborative, conversational, and oral
tradition of judgment, lost to us from antiquity, and puts in sharp
relief the adversative traditions of our own culture. When did
judging, these articles jointly ask, lose this lovely capaciousness?
What happened to amorousness, flirtatiousness, and collabora-
114. Peter Goodrich, Amatory Jurisprudence and the Querelle des Lois, 76 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 751 (2000).
115. P. Christopher Smith, The Uses of Aristotle in Gadamer's Recovery of Consultative
Reasoning: Sunesis, Sungn6m8, Epieikeia, and Sumbouleuesthai, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 731
(2000).
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tiveness, as desirable features of humane adjudication? Both of
these interpretive pieces are surely critical -Goodrich of rationalism,
and Smith of adversativeness.11 6 Both suggest authors who have
ethically opened themselves to dialogue with past texts, and both
authors invite readers to do the same. Both of these interpretations
of texts exhibit the virtues -openness, collaborativeness, a sensitivity
to all things human, a simultaneous use of and detachment from one's
own prejudices, a curiosity about and even a limited submission to the
authority of the past-of Gadamerian hermeneutics.
But those virtues are obviously trivialized, if they are everywhere
on display, in every act, in every thought, in every communicative
exchange. We sometimes interpret, and when we do so, we
sometimes do so well or not so well. But we also do not always
interpret. Even when faced with marks that look like "meaningful"
human utterances, we do not always interpret: as Walter Benn
Michaels has argued, if we see a word written in the sand on the
beach, we might try to make out what it says and what it means,
unless we are told that the marks were caused by the tides, in which
case we would typically stop doing that."7 Sometimes, though, I
would add, we do not interpret even when faced with human-
produced utterances or writings: sometimes we just obey. Sometimes
we would rather follow than interpret. Some laws might be of that
sort-although one is sorely tempted to hope not, particularly in
constitutional law. And it is just odd to speak of interpretation when
engaged in activities that appear to be aimed at a different end
altogether: swimming, bathing, hoeing the ground, giving birth, dying.
Sometimes, of course, we engage in activities that require inter-
pretation, among much else. Interpretation, when we do it, should be
done well. Like water, interpretation is important enough-even
crucial to our survival-that we should be wary of trivializing it with
the insistence that it is everywhere.
CONCLUSION
Where does adjudication fit in? Sometimes judges interpret, as
do critics, but judging requires more than the interpretation of text, as
does legal criticism. Judges must both interpret legal texts and make
judgments; critics must both interpret legal texts and criticize. Both
116. See generally Goodrich, supra note 114; Smith, supra note 115.
117. Steven Knapp & Walter Benn Michaels, Against Theory, 8 CRITICAL INQUIRY 723
(1982).
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making judgments and criticizing texts, practices, or social worlds
require the exercise of our moral capacity- although different moral
capacities-as well as our understanding of the meaning of texts. The
acts of judging and of criticizing have some commonalities, some of
which are in turn shared by the act of interpreting. But it is hard to
see what is to be gained by insisting on their sameness, by insisting
that the area of overlap is total.
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